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Speech, Time and Suffering: Rosenstock-Huessy’s 
Post-Goethean, Post-Christian Sociology
Abstract   Five years ago, a new three volume edition of Eugen Rosenstock-
Huessy (to translate) In the Cross of Reality: A Post-Goethean Sociology ap-
peared in Germany. As with the two prior editions of the work (a one volume 
version in 1925, and a much revised and expanded two volume version 1956/8) 
it met with almost no critical response. This is perhaps not surprising – and it 
barely mentions any other sociologists, its approach is highly idiosyncratic, it 
is as much anthropology and history as it is sociology. Indeed, the second and 
third volumes mainly focus on the social formations of antiquity, and the role 
of Christianity and the messianic revolutions of the last millennium in creating 
a universal history. In this paper I take the relationship between speech, time 
and suffering as the key to Rosenstock-Huessy’s argument for why a theoreti-
cal grasp of Christianity as a social power is so important for social theory, and 
why he sees Sociology as a post-Christian form of knowledge. I also make the 
case for why Rosenstock-Huessy is an interesting and important social theorist.
Keywords: Names, tribes, empires, city-states, Israelites, Christianity, revo-
lutions, post-Christian
Introduction
Works that are out of time are sometimes out of time because the con-
stitutive forces of a particular moment are so compelling in their demand 
for attention, something else that should be noticed is ignored. Almost 
half a century after its initial conception, and in the aftermath of the 
Second World War, few cared when Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy (1888–
1973), at 70 years old, finally saw the release of the two volume presenta-
tion of his sociological system as a „cross of reality“: Soziologie (Sociology) 
(Rosenstock-Huessy 1956, 1958): (volume 1 The Hegemony of Spaces 
(1956) and volume 2 The Fullness of the Times (1958)).ͱ
The Sociology did get some reviews in Germany, but they mainly ex-
pressed bewilderment about what it was doing. One reviewer, capturing 
the sentiment of the times, dismissed it as a mere „remnant of the German 
1  The Gormann-Thelen et. al. edition (Rosenstock-Huessy 2008–2009) is three 
volumes. It is this edition that is referenced throughout. All references to the Soziolo-
gie will be to an unpublished English translation (still in progress). All other translations 
from German, unless otherwise stated, are mine. 
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spirit (Rosenstock-Huessy 2008–9: 3.813–814)“. To Germans who were 
largely caught between the alternatives of trying to deny, forget, come to 
grips with, own up to, and move on from their immediate history, Rosen-
stock-Huessy’s seemingly archaic concerns, and vast historical sweeps, 
reaching from the tribes through the ages of the Church to modern times, 
seemed to bear no relationship to their needs. For his part, Rosenstock-
Huessy on the verge of academic retirement, and living in the relative 
seclusion of Vermont, while using various ideas from the Sociology in 
his lecture materials to Dartmouth undergraduates, did not write an 
English version of his magnum opus.
Matters were not helped by the fact that Rosenstock-Huessy, who had 
only somewhat reluctantly come to see himself as a sociologist, took 
little effort in positioning himself within the discipline of Sociology 
which was then entering its golden age. Then there was the problem of 
the work having been written over a life-time; its coherence was far from 
easy to grasp, and if his „knowledge-bank“ was that of an immensely 
well-read interdisciplinary university professor, his „voice“ was nothing 
like that of other refugees making their way in social thought in the 
United States (some of whom, like Buber, and Tillich he knew well, others 
of whom, Strauss, Löwith, Bloch, Marcuse and Adorno he could not 
abide). But most problematic of all, his Sociology was not only replete 
with religious language, it was also an attempt to justify and explicate a 
universal history whose very possibility was deeply indebted to Christianity. 
In an intellectual environment where anything smelling of religion should 
be treated „objectively“, or, better, left to theologians, who could safely 
be ignored as irrelevant for social science, Rosenstock-Huessy, though 
appreciated by some historians, particularly in Germany, suffered, as he 
himself reflected upon on the last page of Out of Revolution from lack 
of „fit“ (Rosenstock-Huessy 1993: 758).
To be sure, around the time of the completion of the Sociology Rosenstock-
Huessy had been invited back to Germany where he taught at Münster 
and was awarded an honorary doctorate, and a devout group of students 
gathered around him. But these were small rewards for a man whose book 
was intended to inaugurate a revolution in the social sciences.
In an earlier life, some forty years earlier, Rosenstock-Huessy had en-
gaged in a powerful polemical „religious“ dialogue with his Jewish friend, 
the philosopher Franz Rosenzweig (Rosenstock-Huessy 2011).Ͳ But at a 
2  The dialogue with Rosenzweig of 1916 was a personal encounter between two 
close friends. It was frequently acrimonious, as each party stood on the ground of 
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time when Israel and Jewishness had for so many become synonymous, 
Rosenzweig and the dialogue he had had with Rosenstock-Huessy was 
something for a rather small group who were interested in far longer 
waves of time than might be taken seriously by those so traumatized by 
the horror that they had just survived.
Although Rosenstock-Huessy had left Germany immediately upon Hitler 
coming to power, and after the Second World War had frequently re-
ferred in his lectures and writings to the Nazi horrors and the extermi-
nation of the Jews (most notably in Rosenstock-Huessy 2002; also Rosen-
stock-Huessy 2008–9: 2. 158, 259; 3: 237; Cf. Rosenstock-Huessy 1992), 
his primary focus was not upon the totalitarian collisions and horrors 
that dominated the twentieth century, but the broader historical currents 
and great socio-historical forces and longitudinal waves of world-making 
faith. For him the world wars of the twentieth century not only formed 
a unity amongst themselves but they were very much the outcomes of 
their faith. A common tendency within Rosenzweig scholarship – repeated, for 
example, by Micha Brumlik at the 2013 Jahreskonferenz des Simon-Dubnow-Instituts 
für jüdische Geschichte und Kultur über Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy (1888-1973) – has 
been to completely decontextualize the dialogue and to paint Rosenstock-Huessy as 
a Jewish apostate (his parents were non-religious Jews by birth), Christian proselytizer 
and anti-Semite. For a refutation of this position see the only book length treatment 
of the intellectual relationship between Rosenstock-Huessy and Rosenzweig (Cri-
staudo 2012a). The key points are as follows. First, once Rosenzweig embraced his 
Jewish faith, Rosenstock-Huessy had no interest in converting Rosenzweig to 
Christianity – and he stated this explicitly in the 1916 correspondence – it was 
Rosenzweig that initiated the „dialogue“ of 1916, wanting his friend to understand 
the reasons behind his „conversion“. Secondly Rosenstock-Huessy wrote a poem 
celebrating the outcome of the dialogue, which, for him, was that he had been 
convinced by Rosenzweig that Judaism was not a form of paganism, but the ahistorical 
revelation – the eternal star – while Christianity was the ever becoming historical path 
of revelation. Thirdly, he wrote a highly affirmative review of The Star of Redemption 
(Rosenzweig 2005) in 1921 (Rosenstock-Huessy 2013: Microfilm page: 2–3 Item 
number: 111 Reel number: 2). Fourthly, he returned to Germany in 1935 to help launch 
Rosenzweig’s Letters. In that edition, in accordance with Edith Rosenzweig’s wishes, 
he wrote a Preface to the 1916 correspondence (the correspondence being considered 
so important to Rosenzweig’s ideas and development that they were treated as an 
„entity“ in that edition.) In that Preface, in a non-too subtle dig at what he saw as Karl 
Barth’s failure to support the Jewish people of Germany, Rosenstock-Huessy argued 
that the dialogue with Rosenzweig of 1916 was the issue of the day for Germans who 
needed to see how mutually dependent German Christians and Jews were upon each 
other (this was the core thesis of Rosenzweig’s Star of Redemption). Fifthly, in the 
Sociology (Rosenstock-Huessy 2008–9: 1. 238–243) and The Christian Future (Ro sen-
stock-Huessy 1966: 165–197), Rosenstock-Huessy would argue that Judaism was a truth 
that constituted one pole of what he called „the cross of reality“: Christianity, Taoism 
and Buddhism constituted the other three poles. Finally there are countless references 
by Rosenstock-Huessy to the fact that his and Rosenzweig’s thought needs to be 
taken together as examples of speech thinking, and thus his system and Rosenzweig’s 
are complements. 
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modern idolatries – the idolatry of the nation, of race, of the leader, of the 
community, of science, of the economy. „Idolatry“ is not a term with much 
currency in social science, while it is the kind of term that theologians 
can cut their teeth on. But Rosenstock-Huessy had little time for theology, 
and what interested him was the social significance of what we attend 
to, or what, in more archaic times, we would have expressed by the phrase 
„the gods we serve“ (cf. Rosenstock-Huessy 2008–9: 1. 382–384). Rosen-
stock-Huessy was Augustinian enough to grasp that we make reality 
through our service, and supplications, our dedications and aspirations, 
through the attendances of our loves. But we also make it out of the stock 
of possibilities and potentialities that are part of the interplay of the calls 
and behests we summon up and respond to.
In this respect Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy was a Christian thinker, just as 
Rosenzweig was a Jewish thinker – in so far as both thinkers dedicated 
their lives not only to extrapolating upon the socio-historic meaning of 
those ways of world-making, but continuing within their respective paths 
of faith. Thus we would more accurately say that both thinkers were 
preoccupied with the social activations and world making potencies that 
came from being positioned in the world through not only two diverse, 
but inimical and yet mutually interdependent heritages and calls from 
the future. For future, Rosenstock-Huessy insists (specifically against 
Schelling’s tripartite view of time in which past is what we know about, 
present what we cognize, and future what we divine [Rosenstock-Huessy 
2008–9: 2. 16–21]) has sense and significance when it is appreciated not 
as the simply grey unknown but the promise of destiny. Past and future 
become meaningful, actualized, when we respond to them as creatures 
who have a destiny – and the Christian virtues of love, hope and faith, 
for him, irrespective of how they are now symbolized or ritualized, are 
behind the faith that our future so that we can be more than our past. 
But this can only be appreciated by contrasting the historical flows and 
interstices that were generated by different venerations and appellations.
In the aftermath of the Second World War there was very little receptivity 
to the kind of theo-political approach which has been briefly outlined, 
and which was so central to Rosenstock-Huessy (and Rosenzweig). But 
with the confluence of identity politics, and post-structuralist emphases 
upon culture and narrative seeping into social areas which had once been 
the province of theologians, there is now a far greater willingness, at least 
outside the Anglo-American philosophical tradition, to take cognizance 
of the social and anthropological significance of religion as a means of 
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world-making. In this context, then, Rosenstock-Huessy’s sociological in-
sights and the method behind it now sound strikingly contemporary. In 
what follows I will provide an overview of what is behind Rosenstock-
Huessy’s sociological system and its Christian and post-Christian character.
Speech
At the basis of Rosenstock-Huessy’s Sociology is the central concern of 
his life: Sprache – language, or, as he preferred to call it, „living speech“.ͳ 
It was the one constant that held together an enormous corpus that 
covered topics as diverse as Egyptology, industrial law, Church history 
and the work-place. Speech is not simply a tool of description, or a means 
for communicating ideas or thoughts between persons, as Saussure, in a 
famous diagram from his Course in General Linguistics represents language, 
as that which passes between heads. It is the creative and redemptive 
process of sociality and solidarity which designates where, how and when 
we make our world. Nor does it refer to mere communicative „babble“, 
or everyday signing, or the stale formulae of the sort which has taken up 
so much of the effort of linguistic philosophy. Living speech refers to the 
significant irruptions and formal, declarative, urgent pacts, promises, 
behests, expressions and articulations that form our sociality (Rosen-
stock-Huessy 1981: 2–10, 28–3). It declares war and peace; calls forth new 
endeavors; founds families, clans, tribes, empires, states; affixes roles. In 
sum, it serves as the institutional seal and stamp of authority, solidarity, 
or revolt. It is embedded as much in the codes of our sociality expressed 
through dress – „we enter the social body through dress which represents 
a temporary body“ – as in what comes out of our mouths (Rosenstock-
Huessy 1981: 79). For Rosenstock-Huessy, just as „ritual forever enacts 
the first victory over speechlessness“, „speech and dress are the continu-
ation of ritual“ outside of the assemblage in which it occurs (Rosenstock-
Huessy 1981: 87–88).
Speech is also the root of our unique relationship to time – for we do not 
simply flow in time, but we salvage time, and we pass it along across 
generations. Likewise, we do not simply have past, and present and fu-
ture, but we recall a past, and we respond to a future because we have the 
grammar to enable us to do so. We do this because of the imploding and 
exploding pressures and forces that hurl us out of the secure spaces we 
3  For other writings on Rosenstock-Huessy and speech see Stahmer’s introductions 
to (Rosenstock-Huessy 1970b, 1981) as well as Stahmer 1968, Rohrbach 1973 Cristaudo 
2012a, 2012b).
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inhabit. Rosenstock-Huessy claims that we ever exist at the intersections 
of reality, a cross composed of the spatial dimensions of inner and outer 
and the temporal dimensions of the trajective push of past, and the 
projective pull of future. Enmeshed within this „cross of reality“ we con-
stantly find ourselves caught between more life or more death, thus our 
speech „surges in the seam between life and death“ (Rosenstock-Huessy 
1981: 84). Thus too our grammar is the manner or mode speech deploys 
in identifying, creating, occupying and transferring the real.
The humanly real is unlike any other real; it is saturated with voices from 
other times which echo around and flow through us, thereby rendering 
nonsensical any metaphysics of a founding, grounding self of the sort 
reached by philosophical argument along the lines of Descartes. Speech 
and grammar are not something extrinsic or accidental to our nature, 
but they make our nature ours. They are the key to how we participate 
in the cosmos the way we do.
Taking this further Rosenstock-Huessy argues that societies as well as 
souls are grammatically constituted. We can see this, he claims, in the 
professions of complex societies – lawyers, preachers, artists, and scien-
tists – all act in accordance with the grammatical underpinnings that 
shape their very modus operandi within the social order: the lawyers fo-
cuses on whether „breaches and offences“ have been committed; preachers 
on preparing our souls for the future; artists with the exploration of our 
subjective possibilities; and scientists with the structure and nature of 
the objective world. Likewise he argued that the grammatical moods of 
the imperative, subjunctive, narrative, and indicative find their social 
expression and collective forcefulness in politics, literature and the arts, 
in our traditions, and in the sciences (Rosenstock-Huessy 1970b: 187–189).
Against the dominant view of language as a descriptive „tool“ in which we 
attempt to identify the objects of reality and communicate between our-
selves about their significance and nature, Rosenstock-Huessy argues that 
the imperative is the real basis of communicative association and any social 
order (Rosenstock-Huessy 1970b: 54–57). This has largely been forgotten 
as people take the sacrifices and commands that make society work for 
granted – and it is precisely because so many people have taken them for 
granted, that people become ever less capable of realizing that they too 
need to make sacrifices for their future. To no small extent, this reflects 
not only the commercialization of society, but also the favoured gram-
matical moods of the philosophical consciousness (the indicative – „this 
is“, and the subjunctive and normative mood – „would that it were y“, which 
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may then be expressed as the imperative „do y“) that have increasingly 
permeated society with the social success of „philosophism“, the name, 
Carlyle astutely coined for the Enlightenment (Carlyle 2002, 14).
Rosenstock-Huessy’s grammatical basis eschews privileging philosophical 
speech and the metaphysical commitments it contrives: we simply do 
not know what potentialities we can cultivate over time – we and life itself 
are the incalculable. Our grammar facilitates the birth of what we do not 
calculate within our-selves. Thus Rosenstock-Huessy emphasizes that a 
common error amongst philosophers has been to take such a limited 
register of the soul as the adequate measure of who and what we are. 
Instead we must realize that our collective and social existence is predi-
cated on the different vistas we open up in the communions that transpire 
between us; genuine communication is communion. Grammar opens us 
to the different potentialities of the reality that we are by enabling new 
vistas and clusters of voices and hearts and souls and bodies: new clusters 
give birth to new ages and new ages are new worlds. Speech is woven 
into our world and we are woven through speech – the word literally 
becomes flesh as we call upon each other, respond to each other, and 
access powers we would never have known existed were we not able to 
speak. We are not, Rosenstock-Huessy insists, thinking selves whose 
destiny is to be more objective about reality, whatever that may be, but 
responsive creatures, who are transformed through our being called 
into action and into roles – not „cogito ergo sum“, but „respondeo etsi 
mutabor (e.g. Rosenstock-Huessy 1970: 2, 10, 12, 14, 65)“. In an under-
graduate lecture he once said „Nobody is the source of truth. We are all 
only in the metabolism“. (Rosenstock-Huessy 2013: 2, Item number: 641, 
Reel number: 16). And it is this metabolic view of speech and life which 
is intrinsic to his view of society as a whole.
For Rosenstock-Huessy the most elemental and most overlooked linguistic 
unit which society rests upon is the name. Names are etched in a group’s 
historical memory when they seal an event and its concatenations or lay 
down a future direction via promises, constitutions, treaties, laws and the 
like. History seen thus is first and foremost not simply a series of actions 
but of re-membered actions, and the re-membering can only take place 
when naming has occurred. Our social orientation from the moment of 
our birth to our death takes place within a myriad of allocations, place-
ments, accruement of talents and powers that transpire because we have 
the capacity to create, to bind, to affix and disperse, to store and orientate 
– all processes that naming facilitates. Naming reaches from the most 
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personal and intimate – the whisper „I love you darling“– to the most 
public – „you are a murderer and shall be sentenced to death“; „we declare 
war“. Naming is intrinsic to our humanity. And intrinsic to how we make the 
world around us. Yet, somewhat astonishingly, and at least since Plato’s 
Cratylus, and its argument for the superiority of ideas over names, naming 
has invariably been seen by philosophy as a lesser task than thinking. In the 
main, philosophy, has considered the majority of people to be thoughtless, 
thus philosophers also eschew the fact that names – as triggers of meanings, 
of associations, and feelings, of commitments and enmity, signs of honor-
ific and horrific deeds, defeats and great victories – are thrashed out in 
time. And they are frequently revisited – not via logic, but through the 
sifting of memory and artifact, through the re-membering of events on 
the basis of new hopes, fears and insights. Names always reflect something 
of the inside, of the emotional response to an event.
Naming and Times
When Rosenstock-Huessy says „to think means using better names“, 
(Rosenstock-Huessy 1970 b: 174) he is not thinking like a philosopher or 
metaphysician who really thinks that any name is as good as another, 
provided one go about one’s thinking correctly (whatever that may mean 
exactly – being more logical, more astute in matching image/ experience 
and argument with the latest scientific knowledge?). Rather he is thinking 
as a historian and sociologist who sees names as traces of commitment 
and contestation, as someone aware that a name that, for example, once 
bore pride among certain members of a group now is much more widely 
a term of shame, such as National Socialism or Anti-Semite. Names are 
tested socially/ historically so that eventually their proper place in the 
gamut of human experiences may be registered. Judgment day occurs 
every time one epoch breaks with another by condemning to death the 
names that the earlier epoch venerated. To be sure, there is always some-
one/ people with its own biography doing the registering, the survivors. 
Whether the survivors themselves have been worthy of their survival is 
another matter altogether. The moralist in us may wish to enter here to 
make this call – but the question of who is moralizing here is one the 
sociologist may not lightly dispense with. Names continue their weaving 
through us as we make our world. It is this making that it is the core of 
Rosenstock-Huessy’s sociological thinking. It is also why his sociology 
cannot be divorced from history, why the event is as intrinsic to sociology 
as the identification of social roles. Indeed all roles have emerged over 
time. Thus the spaces that we take as the context of social action are 
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themselves the demarcations that transpire from events. Maps are an 
obvious illustration of events shaping spatiality; maps are territorial testi-
monies to struggles and outcomes that have transpired within and over time.
For Rosenstock-Huessy the task of social theory is to reawaken us to 
the meaning of our creative capacities as creatures who dwell in time, 
who may learn from their experiences over time, commune with others 
across times and build together in time. The different calendars of hu-
man kind, for Rosenstock-Huessy, are invariably the record of those 
events which have sufficient forcefulness within a community that it 
celebrates these days. And from the time he announced to Rosenzweig, 
„I philosophize in the form of a calendar“ (Rosenstock-Huessy 2011: 78), 
he would use calendars as clues to the events that most mattered in 
forming communities. However, he was very conscious of the fact that 
the calendar and holidays had increasingly lost their power as the rhythms 
of modern life had largely eliminated genuine festivity and days of 
mourning and celebration.
Calendars, then, are the corollaries of names, but they are also the means 
by which some names are paid special tribute. In any case, for Rosen-
stock-Huessy, our ability to „hear“ the names that are stored within our 
language is equivalent to our capacity to understand where we have come 
from and why and how we have come. Thus Rosenstock-Huessy urges: 
„Audi, ne moriamur – listen, lest we die; or: listen and we shall survive“ 
(Rosenstock-Huessy 1970 b: 22). This is no relatively straightforward matter. 
For as names are invariably the outgrowths of political contestations, 
politics also invariably revolves around renaming. The burial of names 
is also the burial of our relationship to the past. And that relationship, 
in turn, will impact enormously upon how we make the future. For 
Rosenstock-Huessy this is the great problems we moderns face. We have 
cut ourselves off from much of humanity – and we may well mourn that 
loss, and romanticize it by romanticizing the past or the indigene. That 
is, we may not see events and processes of the past for what they were or 
still are, although we may select from other times to serve our own defi-
ciencies in our own dispirited age. We moderns might frequently roman-
ticize the Other, but we all too frequently fail to see ourselves in the 
Other, yet that Other really is our kin And to make the Other but the 
object of our fantasy is as „un-neighbourly“ as making of it an inferior. 
The confluence of times which modernity has harnessed into one plane-
tary economic system is a story in which we find ourselves inescapably 
linked with the Other. This idea is central to Rosenstock-Huessy’s Sociology 
188
WAYNE CRISTAUDO  SPEECH, TIME AND SUFFERING
and it is the reason why the second volume of his Sociology is called The 
Full Count of the Times. For the distinctness of our experiences of forces 
accrued over time is what makes a people. And those forces stand very 
much in relationship to social reproduction, in relationship to the range 
of actions that are undertaken, and called upon each day. Those ways 
and names, though, can only continue as long as they are sufficiently 
connected with a people’s survival – when socially sacrosanct names 
inspire hatred, the speech of a people has become diseased (as he calls 
it) and the accompaniments of diseased speech are war, revolution, cri-
sis or anarchy, and decadence. Of war and revolution, more later, here it 
should just be emphasized, he means the disintegrated or dis-unified 
society where „everybody is making his pile, grabbing more than his 
share. And exploiting his membership in ways unforeseen…in economics, 
the crisis, the depression, is caused by a lack of cooperation and com-
munity“ (Rosenstock-Huessy 1970b: 12).
Decadence not only means that people do not have children, it also 
means that that they do not prove to have the stamina of converting the 
next generation to their own aims and ends. Decadence is the disease 
of liberalism today…It is the disease of the „Last Man“ of Nietzsche 
who twinkles: „What is love: What is a star? What is happiness?“ and 
blasts the future because he could only enter the future by inspiring 
the next generation, and this precisely he declines to do. „Decadence“ 
means to be unable to reach the future, in body or mind or soul. The 
decadence of an older generation condemns the younger to barbarism. 
(Rosenstock-Huessy 1970b: 12)
Rosenstock-Huessy is no conservative arguing that the old ways and old 
names must be upheld. Indeed, he insists that our freedom lies pre-
cisely in inventing new dwelling places of the spirit where the triumph 
of love over death may continue. Thus too he says „[s]ocial disintegration 
is a blessing in disguise since it compels us to wake up“ (Rosenstock-
Huessy 1970b: 12). Catastrophe, though, in the form of the diseases just 
mentioned is the inevitable accompaniment to a society’s failure to love 
sufficiently – to get the balance of right of sacrifice and desire. Rosen-
stock-Huessy frequently cites Giuseppe Ferrari’s formulation that „love 
is sacrifice and desire in the balance“, (Rosenstock-Huessy 2008–9: 1. 194; 
1991: 139) and this formulation provides a diagnostic principle enabling 
us to assess the relative health or sickness of a society. It is noteworthy 
how Freud has become so important to social theory in the last fifty years 
– and our Humanities’ disciplines with their emphasis upon identity and 
desire/ sexuality reflect the very strains and stresses of the contemporary 
world. For desire and sacrifice (usually reconfigured as ethics, and thus 
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in my opinion too abstractly and „play-like“ to be helpful) are generally 
dealt with in total separateness, whereas it is precisely how we combine 
both that contributes to an order in which love itself is realized and not 
simply what we enjoy.
When enjoyment alone becomes the underpinning imperative, genera-
tional conflict is as inevitable as the ensuing catastrophe which may give 
birth to a founding that defines itself against the corruption of the old 
order. This is precisely how the different total revolutions of Europe relate 
to each other. Each one promising, as Rosenstock-Huessy argues at much 
greater length and detail in his Out of Revolution and Die europäischen 
Revolutionen, that the order it will erect will not include the rotten heritage 
that undid the prior one – thus does the Russian Revolution position 
itself as anti-bourgeois, the French Revolution as anti-clerical, the English 
Revolution anti-monarchical, the Reformation anti-papal, and the Papal 
revolution anti-imperial. The success of a revolution brings with it a new 
set of roles and venerations And within our language we still retain the 
various creations that have been named in order to hold a particular 
social body and way of life together. In this respect speech enables us 
to be heirs to the times – but really being heirs means being attuned, 
knowing how to listen to the interplay of names which call from beyond 
the grave and beckon us to a future. The men and women who believe 
that only their time is real time are inviting us to share their shrunken 
reality. These are Nietzsche’s „last men“ – and are they not more prevalent 
than in Nietzsche’s time, blinking up as they do from their profit sheets, 
and mission and vision statements, and policy documents assuring all 
that they have their hands securely on the future – though invariably 
someone else must perform the sacrifice? Rosenstock-Huessy was not 
uncritical of Nietzsche but he found him a powerful prophet who un-
derstood that modernity had no sense of futurity. For Rosenstock-Huessy, 
Nietzsche and Marx were the real eschatologists of the 19th century – 
liberal theologians, not to mention liberal societies, had lost sight of that 
completely („The End of the World, or, When Theology Slept“, in Cristaudo 
and Huessy 2009, 3–16).
Every life-way is a solidification of a particular form of social time itself. 
That is, the patterns of life reproduce a specific set of designations that 
instantiate the founding act of decision for a group to act in a certain way 
in order to survive and make its way in the world. The reproductive act 
is the temporal stamp and social shape of the group living by that act. 
This is why Rosenstock-Huessy looks at the human story as a story of 
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temporal decisions which are but the incarnation of speech – the flesh 
of that speech being the social body which is the institutionalization and 
thus the consolidation and intergenerational transference of potentiali-
ties. All of which for Rosenstock-Hueesy is tantamount to history being 
a tapestry of times, of time bodies.
For Rosenstock-Huessy, our richness as a species comes from our con-
nectedness. The corollary of this is that our impoverishment is, if I may 
put it this way, closely connected with our disconnectedness. For Rosen-
stock-Huessy, the disconnectedness, fragmentation, and debilitation of 
modern men and women largely stems from the lack of powers at their 
disposal, and the root of this is their social amnesia. As he writes in the 
second volume of Sociology, The Full Count of the Times:
increasingly fewer people live with the undulations of history. Man-
kind is sinking into a condition of twilight. For our five senses and all 
time spans shorter than a year leave no effective traces on our con-
sciousness. Only that man can think, who learns to weigh and ponder 
the difference between „10 years ago“ and „today“. But all our media 
of mass communication cover up old-acquired experiences so effi-
ciently, that men swim around in a dusk of times without end points, 
while spaces and their magic keep us spellbound and deceive us about 
the times (Rosenstock-Huessy 2008–9: 2. 54.)
Of course forgetfulness is as intrinsic to us as memory, and not all bad. 
But „it is we who decide what belongs to the past and what shall be part 
of the future“, (Rosenstock-Huessy, 1970b: 19) and how can we make that 
decision without an understanding of the woof and warp of our very 
selves, of the processes which have made us who we are? The great danger 
is the self-deception that comes from taking the consensuses of our 
abstractions as the stuff of life that has been poured into or sacrificed for 
further life. The commodification of the media, the instrumentalization 
and commercialization of education have all contributed enormously 
to the substitution of the empty shell of the sound-bite for the more 
archaic purpose of the name – the potentiality of calling, gathering and 
transference of energy across time. For names are also testimonies of 
effort and experience, and as such they are also indexes of sacrifice and 
temporality – a professional name, such as doctor, lawyer etc. discloses 
the time that is required to gain the powers that can be drawn upon by the 
sick, the accused etc. Today, however, in a time where time is increasingly 
accelerated and we live in the illusion of the relatively timeless (because 
we forget all the time that has gone into making the technologies which 
dispose of time) the time of acquisition is, along with the various stages 
of life, also invariably forgotten. (Although the aspiring professional 
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certainly knows that effort takes time.) Names now lose their aura as 
they are more like production line brands stamped by the processes of 
commercial acquisitiveness, and the accompanying totalizing coalition 
of social and political/ state forces. Which is to say the forces that now 
benefit from the process of reification only intensify a problem that 
Nietzsche had traced back to Socrates and Plato. And Rosenstock-Huessy 
concurs entirely with Nietzsche’s anti-Platonism, providing an even 
more elaborate diagnosis of Socrates in the first volume of Sociology 
than occurs in Nietzsche’s Twilight of the Idols. And in keeping with his 
Nietzschean affinities, Rosenstock-Huessy emphasizes in the Sociology 
that a major task of the work is „to pursue our enemy abstraction“ (Rosen-
stock-Huessy 200-9: 2. 16).
As we have just indicated the confluence of forces which feed into this are 
many. And apart from the socio-economic-political forces referred to 
above are the mechanical processes of modern industrial life, which dis-
solve the creaturely time that is intrinsic to what we are as human beings 
into the inhuman rhythms required for production and distribution. The 
mechanization of modern life rests, of course, upon the mechanistic view 
of life itself which comes out of the scientific revolution. At the basis 
of that revolution was a view of time which was subordinate to space 
– a point amply evident in the metaphysical paradigm reaching from 
Descartes to Kant; both of whom conceive of time purely in relationship 
to the mapping of forces in space.
One and all, the modern mechanistic metaphysicians who embroil them-
selves in the metaphysical conundrums behind their view of nature as a 
totality of laws are complicit in making the experience accessible to the 
scientific understanding the condition of experience itself. There was 
nothing new in Rosenstock-Huessy’s opposition to this – as different as 
they are neither the Romantics nor phenomenologists accepted that. But 
his opposition is at the basis of his Sociology. And why he calls the first 
volume The Hegemony of Spaces. For while it is „natural“ that we inhabit 
spaces and that our understanding of life comes through what we expe-
rience, it is precisely because of the capacity to overcome the natural 
predominance of space by our capacity to found new modes of sociality 
within time that we open up new spaces to inhabit. But we can only do 
this if we grasp our capacity as time builders and not merely prisoners 
of spaces we have inherited. For Rosenstock-Huessy, the social spaces 
(and the forces that are common in the shaping of any social space) es-
sentially break down into those that are safe and settled and which enable 
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us to „play“, and those that are serious because they are not safely settled. 
Play takes place in spaces protected by repeatable rules and formalities, 
where barring accidents, and due to the fact that a performance takes 
place with time, or is measured by time, time itself conforms to the rules 
of the game. Serious life takes place in time’s own making, in irruptions 
where beginnings and ends are frequently unpredictable: one has no idea 
if a return is possible. In serious matters, time is the Rubicon between 
life and/ or ways of life and death. Of course, great games have a degree 
of seriousness in the life of the competitor, but the most serious moments 
in a life imperil relationships, families, territories, nations, empires, and 
even the peace of the planet. History is made by serious actions.
Nevertheless, play also has a very serious side. Following Huizinga (Huiz-
inga 1944) and Horace Bushnell (Bushnell 1864), Rosenstock-Huessy 
argues in The Hegemony of Spaces that play generates the reflective ca-
pacities which help prepare us for conduct beyond the playground. For 
Rosenstock-Huessy the dangerous quality of liberal societies is that they 
become oblivious to the sacrificial conditions that enable play spaces to 
be secure from the tumult of life. In spite of living in the shadows of a 
century dominated by two world wars the predominant emphasis of 
modern liberal democratic societies is one devoted to life as play. Rosen-
stock-Huessy, like many other critics of liberalism of his generation, an-
ticipates Baudrillard in his view of modernity as a stupefied, narcotized 
culture of consumers caught up in the endlessness of play. Though, unlike 
Baudrillard, the trauma and seriousness of Rosenstock-Huessy’s own 
experience of war never leaves him for a moment.
The liberal culture of narcosis is so dangerous because so many people 
literally waste their time so that the freedom of which they are the benefi-
ciaries is not able to be adequately perpetuated. Freedom is the storage 
and transmission of time well spent; revolt and wars break out when time 
is misspent, and generations no longer cooperate across the times. Rosen-
stock-Huessy loves liberty as much as any liberal, but he does not think 
that liberalism is serious enough about the conditions of the fruits it loves, 
largely, to repeat, because of its excessive love of play. The point I think can 
be neatly grasped if we pause upon a formulation from economists which 
encapsualtes the power of a liberal economic order: „consumer sovereignty“. 
From Rosenstock-Huessy’s perspective, the question is: how durable is 
such sovereignty if it does not cultivate the conditions for preserving its 
sovereignty? The insidious danger within liberalism is that its elevation of 
consumption as the decisive force of social meaning requires that con-
sumption ceases to be but one metabolic moment of the social body. Instead 
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it is so elevated that it becomes the very meaning of the social body’s 
existence. But to make the social body serve consumption as such is to 
bring about social vacuity and collapse. For it ignores how we deal with, 
i.e. spend time, on sacrifice and suffering, as if they were not conditions 
of life but simply unpalatable epiphenomenon. The transformation we are 
living through today from a liberal to a corporate state is the result of the 
elevation of consumption under liberalism to the detriment of liberty itself.
It is this emphasis upon the serious use of time and the intrinsic charac-
ter of suffering and sacrifice to sociality that underpins what is distinctly 
illiberal in Rosenstock-Huessy. Liberalism, which is itself the product of 
war and revolution, substitutes a normative, and hence abstract, domain 
of rights in order to legitimize its own perpetuity, when in fact that per-
petuity as much as its origin is the result of sacrificial blood. While liberal-
ism as an ideology is largely in denial about its own illiberal foundations, 
not to mention adaptations and compromises with institutions such as 
the family and religious faiths which may stabilize a liberal society, but 
which have nothing to do with liberalism, Rosenstock-Huessy is interested 
in the multiple formations that we dwell in if we are to live in a society 
strong and healthy enough to nourish us. In other words, Rosenstock-
Huessy’s is deeply attuned to the various social creations which emerge 
from the different social formations that have given human beings the 
ability not only to survive, but to participate in the cosmos in ways, that 
at their best, still arose our awe at their inventiveness and brilliance. Thus, 
in The Full Count of the Times, the overwhelming mood behind Rosen-
stock-Huessy’s reconstructions of the forms of life which have enabled 
humanity to survive and to become conscious of itself as a species with 
talents and powers capable of building a planetary peace and mediating 
its vast differences is gratitude: gratitude toward the tribes, the empires, 
the city-states with their publics, and the „nation of God’s elect“, i.e. the 
Israelites with their synagogue which is also, albeit unwittingly, the pro-
totype of the Church. Each formation has left behind residues of its 
peoples such as masks and warpaths (the tribes), priest-castes, temples 
and division of labour (empires), geniuses (poets, philosophers, legis-
lators), the righteous prophet (the Israelites). All opened up different 
powers of life which we are still heirs to. Further, we are only able to be 
conscious of being their heirs because they each tended to discover and 
accentuate qualities of life that are disclosed through the temporal axis 
that they built their life-way upon. Thus, for example, tribes were espe-
cially reliant on the past because they take their orientation from the dead. 
The empires of antiquity controlled and were controlled by the perpetual 
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present, as they took their agrarian and ceremonial orientation from the 
rotation of the stars. The nations/people (Volk) anticipate the messianic 
time of the future – the Jews who were the first people to think of them-
selves as a people who had been promised a great future by God. And the 
Greeks marked out a fourth-dimension in which time was fused with 
space in the public-space. This fusion created the public/ spectators who 
were able to stand over and above the temporal order of the players, or 
the heroes sung in poems. The perspective of the spectator provides a 
place of orientation safe from the perils of life itself, and thus is the pre-
condition of so many of the resources that are so fundamental in the 
formations, pursuits, administrations, technologies, and entertainments 
of modern peoples. In one schema, Rosenstock-Huessy depicts the in-
novations of tribes, realms, nations, and (the people of the) muses thus:
Tribes create families – Members bear a name
Realms create classes – Inhabitants practise a profession
A nation creates destination/assignation (Bestimmung) – souls come 
to speech
Muses create poetry – Men have time. (Rosenstock-Huessy 2008–9: 
2, 232)
Regarding the muses, he says: 
Until today, the Olympic games, Plato and Aristotle, mathematics, 
and physics and astronomy, tragedy and comedy, have become indis-
pensable elements of education. Because all education creates time 
for evasion, it permits us play … The speech of human thinking (Geden-
kens) is Greek. Each new science furnishes itself with a Greek vocabu-
lary. (Rosenstock-Huessy 2008–9: 2, 229)
It is unnecessary to go further into the detail of the multiplicity of achieve-
ments that Rosenstock-Huessy details of tribes, empires (he mainly draws 
upon Egypt), the Jewish nation and the Greek city-states which he wishes 
his readers to appreciate so that they may realize how the past is alive 
within them. Rosenstock-Huessy’s socio-anthropological excavation is 
undertaken in order to reacquaint us with names that now thoughtlessly 
circulate because we have lost connection with their original meaning 
and power. Sensitivity to names enable us to understand better the dif-
ferent constituent forces of peoples who inhabit different bodies of times. 
It is a key condition to any meaningful dialogue between inimical groups, 
just as it is a key condition to a people’s self-understanding as revealed 
by its own historical journey. In the case of the West, Rosenstock-Huessy 
believes that the names of „God“, „Jesus“, and „Christianity“ have lost 
their lustre for most of the population. That is to say that the names which 
were most venerated and appealed to in the revolutionary transformations 
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that created the European nations are now largely meaningless. Rosen-
stock-Huessy insisted that he was a Christian, but he also held that most 
people in the West have no idea of what is Christian about themselves 
and what is pagan, thus they have no clue about what they stand to lose 
due to their lack of memory of what bore them as the Christian sources 
of much of our reality becomes eclipsed by the „idols“ of modernity: 
commerce, technology, the nation, and modern secular ideologies, which 
are insensitive to how our social potentialities have arisen.
Christianity, Suffering and the Combining of Times
Though Rosenstock-Huessy’s interpretation of Christianity warrants a 
very lengthy book in itself, we can convey the essence of his thinking on 
Christianity succinctly: Christianity was an answer to a deep crisis with-
in antiquity. That crisis was being played out simultaneously in tribes, 
empires, the (Jewish) nation and the (by now conquered/ enslaved) 
Greek-world simultaneously at a juncture in which a small group of Jew-
ish revolutionaries broke with all the mores that were constitutive of each 
of these forms of sociality and undertook a new approach to life. That 
approach was paradoxical in that it renounced all other forms of life, yet 
it was capable of being ingested by those very forms and rejuvenating 
them on new terrains. At the core of this renunciation was the insight 
that death was a condition of life, that one had to die into new life, and 
that, as God’s creation, humanity was not fixed but plastic. Rosenstock-
Huessy saw that Jesus broke with every other elevated type of antiquity– 
emperor, king, hero, prophet, priest, poet. He had understood that as 
God’s children we are beyond all these types, and each type is but a form 
of service, not an end in itself. Jesus, for Rosenstock-Huessy, teaches us 
the infinitude of our potential if we are prepared to renounce the ways 
of the world and move upon the way of God’s love, rather than self-love. 
The dwellings of the world are blessed if they are infused with love, and 
but deadly abodes if that love is lacking. Social formations, seen thus, 
are alive to the extent they are spiritual formations – once the spirit had 
departed, then it is time to turn and leave and find our solidarity and 
loves in new forms: metanoia is the sign of our freedom (Rosenstock-
Huessy 1970 a: 182–190). But it is not only the future and present that is 
reconstituted in this approach – it is also the past itself. This too is some-
thing that, for Rosenstock-Huessy, is uniquely powerful about the Christian 
approach to life: its solidarity (retrospectively grasped) stretches back 
from Adam to the end of times as it breathes life into forms once van-
quished. In the 1916 correspondence with Franz Rosenzweig the dividing 
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issue was over the people of eternity (the Jews) and the people of time 
(Christians). Both would concur there was a fateful interdependency 
between these two peoples. And Rosenstock-Huessy would concede that 
Rosenzweig had taught him how important it was that the Jewish people 
remain a constant reminder of the failure of Christianity to achieve the 
union it required. Nevertheless, Rosenstock-Huessy remained committed 
to seeking this discordant concordance, what he called the metanomic 
society with its underlying tensions and overarching peace (Rosenstock-
Huessy, Eugen. 1993: 689–758). Rosenstock-Huessy also has no illusions 
about how Christianity and empire cooperated to bring the tribes into the 
one spiritual realm of what would eventually become the Christian nations. 
Christianity always operated in a context of tensionality, not the least being 
due to its foundational spirit of renunciation of violence operating in social 
contexts in which military authority and might have been intrinsic to the 
societies in which it took root. The dualism of spiritual and earthly power 
(even when the overlap of powers has been most theocratic) has been with 
Christianity from its origin. Likewise, it has also operated in contexts in 
which all manner of social mores, including folklore, are non-Christian.
Although Rosenstock-Huessy sees the task of Christianity as founding and 
incorporating a universal history, the possibility of a metanomical society 
ultimately requires moving outside of the kind of unity that a single faith, 
such as the Christian faith can provide. Moreover, to the extent that the 
Christian really be open in its search for unity, it requires a renunciation of 
some of its most fundamental powers and creations, not the least its own 
sacraments, symbols and sacred names (Rosenstock-Huessy 1966: 126–127). 
Along with Rosenzweig (and Schelling before them), Rosenstock-Huessy 
saw this as the third or Johannine age of the Church, whose modern founder, 
according to Rosenzweig, is Goethe, who consciously rejuvenates and re-
constitutes the alliance between pagan and the Christian (Rosenzweig, 2005: 
297–304). The geopolitical penumbra of the world wars was, for Rosenstock-
Huessy, Europe exploding beyond itself and dissolved from itself. Potencies 
that emerged out of Europe’s revolutions and wars circulated globally, 
adapted and radically modified in non-Christian, non-European environ-
ments, and together they intensified the facticity of Europe’s and the world’s 
post-Christian character. In the Sociology Rosenstock-Huessy develops 
this idea by claiming that the cross of reality in the modern world requires 
that Christianity be coordinated/ cruciformed with Judaism and Buddhism 
and Taoism (Rosenstock-Huessy 2008–9: 1. 243–247; 1966, 174–191).
Rosenstock-Huessy’s appraisal of other life-ways is rather perfunctory, 
and the schematic renditions of Buddhism and Taoism (though not 
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completely lacking in insight) suggests that Rosenstock-Huessy has fallen 
prey to his own systematizing – something he states in the Introduction 
to The Hegemony of Spaces he explicitly wishes to avoid (Rosenstock-Huessy 
2008–9: 1. 385–386). Nevertheless, what this move shows is a recognition 
of Rosenstock-Huessy of the need for any „great society“ to pool the great 
contrary insights of world making that enables peoples to survive the ages. 
Such a pooling cannot occur within one single dominant modality of a 
past way of world-making. Yet this very possibility, for Rosenstock-Huessy, 
is predicated upon the social absorption of the peculiarly Christian con-
tribution to the understanding of time. While it is The Full Count of the 
Time makes the systemic case for this peculiar grasp of time, the following 
passage from The Christian Future Rosenstock-Huessy most succinctly 
sums up what this view of time is:
Christianity… has shown „how man can be eternal in the moment, how 
he can act once for all“ …. As a French scholar [Jean Guitton] has written, 
„The unsurmountable abyss between Greek and Christian thought is 
the Christian rehabilitation of the unique and temporal event. The 
moral order is general and abstract to every philosophical or Greek 
mind. In Christianity the time of every human existence receives a 
superior quality in its smallest fragments“. …
Man gives his acts an eternal, i.e. a „once-for-ever“ meaning, by throwing 
his whole personality on the side of life that should now come forward, 
at each moment of his march through time. But he can select what 
should come forward, what will make a moment unique, only because 
one end of time like a magnet draws his heart at each step into the 
future. The uniqueness of the present derives from the uniqueness of 
the end. Hence only if history is one can our present-day acts have a 
once-for-ever meaning. (Rosenstock-Huessy 1966: 71–72)
The end time thus serves as a resurrecting power. And through its historical 
devotion to the end time, Christian history reconstitutes already existing 
social formations as well as ones thought spent. The most obvious and 
powerful historical confirmation of the power of the Church to conquer a 
social-form from within was the reconstitution of the Roman Empire itself. 
Rosenstock-Huessy’s faith in Christianity has nothing whatever to do with 
theological or philosophical disputation, but with the positive fact of the 
transformation of powerlessness into power, of the impossible into the 
possible, the invisible into the visible. That process is conspicuous in Con-
stantine’s conversion to the faith, initially, of a handful of Jewish riff-raff 
that emerged in a wretched corner of the Empire in its greatest time of 
glory. The spiritual conquest of Rome gradually extended to the tribes of 
Europe. Equally as astonishing is that this faith would then revive, resurrect, 
redeem past glories of antiquity. First the university was revived, then, as 
humanism evolved, the entire remaining philosophical and classical literary 
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tradition. To be sure in earlier phases Christianity had contributed to the 
destruction of the classical heritage. Rosenstock-Huessy does not for a 
moment deny, then, that fanaticism exists within the Christian tradition 
– fanaticism can be found everywhere. But he does argue that the truth 
of the faith must be seen in the long run in the powers of life it gathers and 
transmits. This, and to repeat, not the attempts to provide rational sense 
to the faith is, for Rosenstock-Huessy, the truth of what this faith is – for 
truth, for Rosenstock-Huessy, as with Goethe, is in the fruits of action, 
not theoretical consistency or fit between representation and reality. Indeed 
such a dualism makes no real sense for Rosenstock-Huessy, unless one has 
already made a metaphysical commitment of the sort that he sees as the 
disastrous one of scientism and mechanism. In the second millennium 
the Church would help precipitate tribes into Christian nations. The 
Church itself would lose power within Europe as many nations broke 
with Rome and created their own national churches. With the French 
revolution Christianity itself was seen as the enemy of liberty, equality 
and fraternity: an amalgam of social ends whose roots, for Rosenstock-
Huessy, were, nevertheless, palpably Christian.
I have said in a few lines what Rosenstock-Huessy argues over the course 
of eight hundred or so pages of The Full Count of the Times, and his two 
studies (similar in content, albeit not in framing) on revolutions are also of 
similar lengths. And I must emphasize here that the historical/ sociological 
argument at the core of his work is that the Church laid the ground for a 
completely new kind of way of life out of the imperial rump and social 
break-down, war-lordism, and tribalism of Western Europe, that the first 
„total revolution“ – between Pope Gregory VII and the emperor Henry IV 
which he called the papal revolution – would be the initial fuse and spark 
in what would be a millennium of revolutions down to the two world-wars 
and the Russian revolution. The social formations that are part of our 
everyday world were the products of revolutions – revolutions that first all 
took place on Christian soil involving Christian appeals that were made in 
reaction to the hellish environments that people found themselves in. 
Hellish environments were not unique to Europe, and, romanticism to the 
contrary, are all too cross-culturally and historically typical. What was 
unusual about Europe was that its faith engendered a unique relationship 
to time and space: its messianic notion of time was, of course, Jewish, and 
the universality of its solidarity had fragmentary precursors amongst some 
of the Stoics, but the combination would prove to be fateful. And the revo-
lutionary tradition reaching even to anti-Christian revolutionaries of the 
French and Russian revolutions built on the same temporal construction 
and the promise – if not the achievement – of a future of total solidarity.
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The lack of that achievement is no doubt conspicuous – but the planetary 
connectedness we now share is a plethora of testimonies to the revolutions 
which have yielded the nation state, and the commercial, scientific and 
administrative powers which make peoples of very different times „now 
coexist“. Rosenstock-Huessy does not argue that this comes from the moral 
superiority of the West. Western history not only reads like one bloody 
dispute and massacre after another, but it was the West that plunged the 
world into two world wars (even if Japan hoped to reap spoils from the 
second one). But (contrary to myth and hope) Christianity not only never 
teaches that good things in the world always and only come out of those 
who do good – God’s grace is a gift to all – it accepts that evil happens to the 
best, to God himself. Christianity also teaches that God saves even the sin-
ner. Augustine would provide the formulation of original sin, deeply im-
plicit in the (anti-Roman) idea of only one man also being God on earth. 
Original sin, a doctrine, typically mocked and misunderstood – contains 
the existential truth that we are creatures who, in spite of our best intentions, 
nobility and gifts, are destined of our own accord to „miss the mark“ (hamar-
tano – sin). It was also Augustine that paired sin with providence. This is 
developed by Rosenstock-Huessy who argues that we have little choice but 
to see history not as progressive in the Enlightenment sense, but as provi-
dential. Providence transforms death into life, past suffering into future 
concordance and conviviality. This does not mean that all suffering is good, 
nor that we should suffer to be or do good – these kind of philosophical 
formulations convey the staleness of abstraction. The imperative made by 
God to Jew and Christian is „love God and love the neighbour“. The suf-
fering comes of its own accord – being in the world is inevitably to be in-
volved in suffering. While Rosenzweig identified the divine declaration of 
Jewish and Christian redemption as being „love is as strong as death“, 
(Rosenzweig 2005: 169, 217, 345–346; also to be found in Rosenstock-Huessy 
2008–9: 2. 76, 201, 228; 2008–9: 3. 63, 475, 484), Rosenstock-Huessy also 
finds Christian history being an answer to the question, which slightly varies 
the formulation, „How does love become stronger than death?“ And he adds:
So history becomes a great song, Augustine’s Carmen Humanum; in its 
every line, perhaps every tone, becomes a lived human life. As soon and 
as often as the lines rhyme, love has once again become stronger than 
death. Then from out of absurd contingencies, from adverse circum-
stances, from silent events of epoch-making necessities in which a 
lengthy ingested illness is finally confronted, cross-fertilized (eingekreuzt) 
and consequently overcome. (Rosenstock-Huessy 2008–9: 3, 513)
One great difference between classical thought (and so much modern 
philosophical, particularly ethical thinking which reproduces it) and 
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Christianity is that the former tries to prevent evil before it happens – the 
latter factors in evil as a perennial accompaniment of this world until we 
are redeemed (i.e. original sin), and then asks of us to make the world with 
the love that we have out of the evil that has happened. We must love and 
act in the midst of and out of our common suffering – for our experience 
tells us that it is unavoidable. Idealism is the delusion that suffering is 
avoidable – the delusion that we can bypass death. One recalls here Rosen-
zweig’s great majestic critical sentence that opens the Star of Redemption 
„All cognition of the all begins with the fear of death“ (Rosenzweig 2005: 
9). In other words, philosophy is a cosmic leap that attempts to escape what 
we cannot escape – except, as Plato with such truthful consistently put it, 
by us residing with the ideas rather than life itself. The classical and philo-
sophical works with purity – the purity of its doctrine, of its method, of its 
ideas etc.; the Christian with impurity – the liar and weakling, Peter, and 
the accomplice tu murder, Paul, are the founders of the Church. Thus, fit-
tingly, Rosenstock-Huessy names one of his works I am an Impure Thinker.
We are, then, for Rosenstock-Huessy, beneficiaries of the sufferings and the 
subsequent historical and social progress achieved by revolutions, which 
originally took place within a social, political and cultural environment that 
had been Christianised. Social progress is, for Rosenstock-Huessy, insepa-
rable from social „sin“, the creative response to suffering, and the historical 
accumulation of modalities of social solidarity and freedom – modalities 
which are ever threatened by the „sin“ – the selfish unneighbourly be-
haviours of the society’s members. For Rosenstock-Huessy, the French and 
Russian revolution overthrow the political authority and power of the orig-
inal body – the Church – which was founded to universalize the command-
ment of redemption and neighbourly love. With the success of the secular 
nation state the symbols and appeals of Christianity have now all but disap-
peared in its traditional „strongholds“ as activators of the social conscience.
Conclusion: Sociology A Post-Goethean 
and Post-Christian Science
Rosenstock-Huessy called his sociology a post-Goethean work. Goethe, he 
wrote, „has made the gospel truths accessible to believers and unbelievers“. 
„Goethe’s free speech“, he continues, „has found all these truths afresh. 
So now we can know that the Church had to teach them because they 
were true whereas before we were asked to hold them to be true because 
the Church taught them“. (Rosenstock-Huessy 2013: „Tribute from a Post-
Goethean“). In other words, Rosenstock-Huessy saw Christianity not pri-
marily as a dogma, but as the true realization of the relationship between 
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death, survival, love, suffering, historical purpose, and social redemption 
(„Tribute from a Post-Goethean“, 1968, item no. 581, reel 12). Goethe wrote 
in an age where religious language and symbolism were the common 
social currency and to the believer who severed speech from deed and 
worldly experience, Goethe was easily mistaken as a man without 
religious faith. In our age of secular speech the existential dimension of 
religious symbols and speech tends to get lost – religious rite, ritual, and 
symbol/ (including speech) are submerged under the personal dimension 
of one’s faith. Not surprisingly religion appears to so many secularists as 
some kind of grotesque fairy-tale. Hence Rosenstock-Huessy can easily 
appear (as he did to his positivist enemies at Harvard) a religious kook.
For Rosenstock-Huessy the experience of real life – which must include 
the processes of metamorphosis, including those involving death and 
life – is the great mystery that implicates humanity in its faiths as much 
as in its knowledge, in its worships and artistic expression as much as in 
in its material reproduction. When the real experience at the basis of any 
name or symbol has been forgotten and people simply speak abstractly 
about matters once held sacred the living spirit has long since departed.
For Rosenstock-Huessy this is also the case with Sociology itself. Whereas 
most academicians would see little or no connection between the social 
sciences which evolved in the West and the Christian culture in which 
universities since the Middle Ages played a decisive part in social 
reproduction, Rosenstock-Huessy sees that Sociology itself was spawned 
in the process of social metamorphosis as the social realities which had 
formed the symbolic and spoken truths embedded in Christianity now 
were being poured into new forms. Rosenstock-Huessy argues that Comte 
de Saint-Simon saw this and that this insight was fundamental to the 
creation of Sociology as „a system of therapeutics“ which centered around 
human suffering. This emphasis upon the alleviation of suffering, he 
claims, contrasts with the liberal and Greek priorities of mind and society:
When Saint-Simon chose the way of the sociologist, with the great 
catch-phrases, „the crisis of Europe“, „the sufferings of our contempo-
raries“, „the misery of poverty“, he was seeking to institute a system of 
therapeutics for the temporal orders it still lacked. In his view, [these 
were] what Christianity had provided for the spiritual order (i.e., the 
Church) – a lawful and necessary structure. Science becomes the science 
of sinners; Christians, suffering human beings. [W]hat a contrast to 
the pre-sociological science, which seems to be the prerogative of the 
just man, the educated man, the wise man, the philosophical thinker, 
the estimable character and the rational mind (Rosenstock-Huessy 
2013: „What Is New about Sociology?“. reel 8, item 438, 1)
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In conclusion, then, Rosenstock-Huessy was well aware that the West had 
metamorphosed into a post-Christian society. To the extent that the world 
wars had to different degrees transposed the social and institutional 
axes of Western revolutions into all regions of the globe, it was not only 
inevitable, but desirable that the powers inherent in Christian dogma 
give way to forms more consistent with the reflexive culture of moder-
nity (in spite of all its pathologies and spiritual blind-allies). (Likewise, 
it was desirable and inevitable that the store of powers accrued by other 
faiths also be circulated far beyond their location of origin.) Sociology 
was one of the important forms of the post-Christian means of opening 
up the hearts and consciences of members of society to the sufferings of 
their neighbours. Thus he writes:
sociology…is bound in with and bound to mankind’s condition of 
suffering. It is not a presupposition-free science. Everything known 
to sociology is known only because suffering is a fundamental fact. 
From the very first, her only knowledge is that human beings suffer, 
that accordingly something is not as it should be. Indeed she can 
scarcely know anything else…
Saint-Simon remains similarly unshackled by „presuppositionless“ 
thinking. He grows out of Christianity. His freedom of thought wants 
to be nothing other than post-Christian. The solidarity of the whole 
human family is presupposed….
We are scarcely ever up to the mark in our understanding of the enor-
mity of Saint-Simon’s and Goethe’s truth. But it is our only recourse for 
transforming minus into plus. If we cannot draw the negativities into 
our life, human society is lost. Practically none of the answers of Saint-
Simon to his questions has any relevance for us today. But in his question 
we have recognized a spiritual attitude that corresponds to a particular 
rung on the ladder of the natural spirit – the post-Christian. And now 
we have to ask ourselves if this principle of a post-Christian science is 
apt to commit us to sociology. (Rosenstock-Huessy, 2008–9: 2. 46–47)
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Vejn Kristaudo
Govor, vreme i patnja: 
Rozenštok-Hisijeva postgeteovska, posthrišćanska sociologija
Sažetak
Pre pet godina, novo trotomno izdanje dela Na krstu stvarnosti: postgeteovska 
sociologija (In the Cross of Reality: A Post-Goethean Sociology) Eugena 
Rozenštoka-Hisija objavljeno je na nemačkom. Kao u slučaju prva dva izdanja 
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dela (jednotomno izdanje iz 1925, i značajno redigovano i prošireno dvotomno 
izdanje iz 1956/8), i ovo nije doživelo gotovo nikakav kritički odjek. To možda i 
nije toliko iznenađujuće – delo ne pominje gotovo nijednog drugog sociolo ga, 
autorov pristup je izuzetno idiosinkratičan, i mogao bi se svrstati u antro po lo-
giju i istoriju gotovo isto koliko i sociologiju. Drugi i treći tom se odista uglav-
 nom fokusiraju na društvene formacije u vreme antike, i na ulogu hrišćanstva 
i mesijanskih revolucija poslednjeg milenijuma u stvaranju svetske istorije. 
U ovom radu fokusiram se na Rozenštok-Hisijeve koncepcije govora, vre-
mena i patnje, koje su od centralnog značaja da bi se shvatilo zbog čega on 
smatra da je teorijsko poimanje hrišćanstva kao faktora oblikovanja društvene 
stvarnosti toliko značajno za društvenu teoriju, i zbog čega Rozenštok-Hisi 
vidi sociologiju kao post-hrišćanski oblik saznanja. Takođe ću braniti sta no-
vi šte da je Rozenštok-Hisi zaniml jiv i važan društveni teoretičar.
Ključne reči: Imena, plemena, imperije, gradovi-države, Izraelićani, hrišćan-
stvo, revolucije, posthrišćansko
